Stories of Resistance: Venezuela’s Communal Pharmacy Challenges US Sanctions

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High on the hillsides of the Waraira Repano mountain, a sea of cinderblock homes pushes up to the edge of the forest.

This is the commune of Altos de Lidice. They have been organizing. Organizing to bring sports to local kids in the community. Organizing to ensure that everyone in the neighborhood has access to water, education, and, above all, health.

These are dire needs in 2019 Venezuela.

US sanctions are wreaking havoc. They were first imposed by Obama and then ramped up by Trump. They block Venezuela from trading internationally and selling oil, its top export. The sanctions have unraveled the economy and spiked inflation. Millions of Venezuelans are fleeing the country.

Broken cars sit along roadsides, because there are no parts to fix them. Water systems are failing, because replacement parts can’t be purchased from abroad. Health supplies are hard to find. So is medicine.

The shelves of pharmacies across the country are empty. Pharmacists say almost half of their product is impossible to acquire. The medicine they do have is so overpriced, it’s out of reach for most Venezuelans.

“People with cancer pretty much just die, because they just can’t afford it,” one pharmacist in Caracas tells me.

And that is what’s happening. According to one study, tens of thousands of people have died over the last two years, due to the sanctions. People with cancer, people who need dialysis, people with diabetes and hypertension, and who can’t acquire insulin or heart meds.

But neighbors in the Altos de Lidice commune are standing up for each other. They’ve created a community pharmacy. They get the medicine from anywhere they can. Donations from abroad. From individuals. Solidarity groups. Medicine has been brought to them from Australia, Brazil, Italy, and Chile.

It’s run by a health committee organized by a group of neighbors. They meet in one of their homes. The same place the pharmacy is run out of.

A sign sits out front. “Communal Pharmacy. Health for the Barrio.”

The medicine is all free. It’s delivered to those with a doctor’s note from the local community health clinic. Which is also free.

It’s one small service. But for those in the community here, it’s making a tremendous difference. It’s a matter of survival. A lifeboat in a sea of struggle.

Community resistance, in the face of harsh sanctions—and US intervention.

This is the sixth episode of Stories of Resistance.

Stories of Resistance is a new project, co-produced by The Real News and Global Exchange. Each week, we’ll bring you stories of resistance like this. Inspiration for dark times.

If you like what you hear, please subscribe, like, share, comment, or leave a review.

Written and produced by Michael Fox.

You can find out more about the communal pharmacy in Michael’s 2019 story for The Real News: Venezuelan Community Builds Solidarity Pharmacy to Counter US Sanctions

Here is a report by the Washington-based Center for Economic and Policy Research Center, which looks at the thousands of deaths that occurred in Venezuela during this period due to US sanctions: Report Finds US Sanctions on Venezuela Are Responsible for Tens of Thousands of Deaths

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelan editorial staff.

Source: The Real News

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The Venezuelanalysis Podcast Episode 35: Popular Feminism in Venezuela

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Our latest podcast episode coincides with International Working Women’s Day (March 8) to take stock of popular feminist struggles under the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela.

VA staff member Cira Pascual Marquina joins host José Luis Granados Ceja to discuss the impact of sanctions on women, the role of women in popular power, a recent conservative/religious offensive, and lots more!

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Venezuela-owned Petrochemical Firm Inches Closer to Privatization Amid Sanctions Tightening

Mexico City, Mexico, March 10, 2025 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Monómeros has requested permission from Colombia’s Corporation Superintendency to proceed with the sale of assets to Colombian fertilizer company Nitrofert, marking an important step forward in the privatization of the Venezuelan state-owned agrochemical company.

The sale of Monómeros by the Venezuelan government is motivated by an effort to head off a likely crackdown by the US Treasury Department.

The Venezuelan agrochemical company, a subsidiary of state-owned Pequiven, currently operates under sanctions waivers issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control that are set to expire this year. Given the White House’s recent decision to escalate coercive measures against Venezuela, it is widely expected that this waiver will not be renewed.

Last week, the Monómeros board sent a letter to Colombia’s corporate watchdog requesting permission to sell its assets. The move underscores Caracas’ desire to transfer ownership of the agrochemical firm.

Founded as a joint venture between Venezuela and Colombia, Monómeros became fully owned by Venezuela’s Pequiven in 2006. The subsidiary plays a critical role in supplying fertilizer and other agrochemicals used by Colombian coffee, potato and palm oil producers and stabilizing agricultural input prices, which directly impacts rural livelihoods. Accordingly, Colombian President Gustavo Petro has previously expressed his firm opposition to the potential sale.

“The privatization and sale of Monómeros will lead to higher prices for primary agricultural products in our countries,” read a public letter published by Petro in late 2024. Bogotá was exploring financing options for a state purchase of Monómeros but there has been no reported progress.

Colombia’s Corporation Superintendency, which has previously stepped in to oversee the company given its importance in Colombia’s food production, must approve the sale. Former Colombian Energy Minister Amilkar Acosta Medina told Inside LR that he expected the sale to generate tensions with Washington given that it would imply money would flow to a Venezuelan state-owned company.

The potential buyer is said to be Nitrofert, a firm led by Venezuelan national Jorge Pacheco, who has alleged close ties to the Colombian far right and the Venezuelan opposition, specifically to hardline figures such as Leopoldo López and his protege Juan Guaidó, the one-time self-proclaimed “interim president” of Venezuela.

Nitrofert is connected to Nitron Group, a US-based trader specialized in fertilizer products. Nitron Group is said to be the number 2 distributor of agrochemical inputs in the world. An acquisition of Monómeros would give it further power to set prices in the fertilizer market and boost its dominance over the Colombian market.

Monómeros suffered greatly when it was run by the US-backed hardline opposition. While managed by successive Guaidó-appointed boards, Monómeros was plagued by scandals and corruption allegations, which severely impacted its productivity and generated serious issues for Colombia’s rural producers.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

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Venezuela To Reject Further Deportation Flights as US Ramps Up Economic Sanctions

Caracas, March 9, 2025 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government will not accept more deportation flights from the US following a recent escalation of coercive measures against the Caribbean country.

According to the Wall Street Journal, the Nicolás Maduro government has “privately warned” the Trump administration that it will not coordinate new repatriations after the US Treasury Department withdrew a license allowing Chevron to operate in Venezuela.

Caracas has not publicly commented on the issue, with the Journal citing people familiar with the matter.

Venezuela has received three groups of returned nationals following a high-profile meeting with White House Special Envoy Richard Grenell. The flights brought back nationals from Texas, Guantánamo (via Honduras) and Mexico. On the latter, Venezuelan authorities did not clarify if the Venezuelan families had been deported from the US to Mexico or if they had not managed to cross the border.

The Trump administration has prioritized a migrant crackdown in its first weeks in office, particularly targeting Venezuelans. The Department of Homeland Security rescinded Temporary Protective Status (TPS) for Venezuelan migrants, leaving as many as 600,000 at potential risk of deportation.

Venezuela’s reported reluctance to maintain engagement with the US on deportations follows Washington’s recent removal of General License 41 (GL41) which allowed Chevron to run crude extraction and export operations in its Venezuela joining ventures.

Instead, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 41A (GL41A) establishing a 30-day period for the oil giant to wind down its activities in the South American nation.

The move, first announced by Trump on February 27, contrasted with the White House’s early policy of engagement with Caracas. According to reports, the administration hardened its economic pressure against Venezuela as a concession to foreign policy hardliners ahead of a crucial budget vote.

Florida Representatives Mario Diaz-Balart, Carlos Gimenez and Maria Elvira Salazar provided crucial votes for the narrowly approved budget. Though they also opposed the cancellation of TPS, which affected their constituencies, the Cuban-descent politicians focused their lobbying efforts on tighter sanctions against Venezuela.

The removal of General License 41 undid the Biden administration’s only significant departure from the “maximum pressure” sanctions policy put in place during Trump’s first term. The Biden White House issued General License 44 in October 2023, allowing Venezuela to export crude without levying heavy discounts or resorting to unreliable intermediaries. However, widespread restrictions were re-introduced after six months.

Washington has targeted Venezuela’s all-important oil sector in recent years in an effort to strangle the country’s main revenue source. US Treasury coercive measures have included financial sanctions, an export embargo and secondary sanctions.

Chevron holds minority stakes in four joint projects that currently pump an estimated 200,000 barrels per day (bpd), just under a quarter of the industry’s total output. Analysts have predicted that its impending exit will hurt the Venezuelan government’s social spending ability and potentially trigger higher inflation.

After forcing Chevron out of Venezuela, US officials have reportedly granted similar 30-day wind-down periods to French corporation Maurel & Prom and the US’ Global Oil Terminals. The latter conglomerate, owned by magnate Harry Sargeant III, had secured a significant asphalt import deal until 2026.

European companies Eni (Italy) and Repsol (Spain), which have likewise increased their activities in Venezuela in recent years following US Treasury approval, are expected to be driven out in the coming weeks as well. Indian refining giant Reliance Industries received a green light to import Venezuelan crude, but it is unclear if the arrangement was open-ended or had an expiration date.

Venezuela’s dealings with international partners also allowed state oil company PDVSA to access highly needed diluents and light crude required to produce export blends and produce fuel. The recent sanctions ramp-up could additionally lead to gasoline and diesel shortages.

For its part, the Maduro government criticized the Chevron sanctions waiver withdrawal as “damaging and inexplicable” and accused its US counterpart of bowing to pressure from Venezuela’s hardline opposition.

Venezuelan authorities went on to activate an “Absolute Productive Independence” plan to ensure the stability of the energy sector. Maduro vowed that the oil sector would maintain its upward trend despite the tightening of coercive measures.

Edited by José Luis Granados Ceja in Mexico City, Mexico.

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Feminism and Revolution: A Conversation with Alejandra Laprea

Over the past decade, Venezuela’s feminist movement has strengthened its international presence, particularly through the World March of Women. Alejandra Laprea, a longtime activist and one of two continental representatives on the March’s International Committee, has been at the forefront of these efforts. In this conversation, Laprea discusses the evolution of popular feminism, the challenges posed by the global conservative backlash, the economic blockade and its impact on women, and the urgent tasks ahead for feminists within the Bolivarian Revolution.

Let’s begin by talking about you, Alejandra. Where are you from, and when did you commit yourself to feminism?

I was born in Guayana, a mining state in the south of Venezuela, but I moved to Caracas about thirty years ago. Around that time, I became committed to popular feminism. That is the perspective from which I speak, understanding that popular feminism is not a finished product but an ongoing process of collective construction.

In the early 2010s, I was part of “La Araña Feminista,” a feminist collective network, and we had become increasingly concerned about the media blockade Venezuela was facing, even within international feminist circles. In a national meeting in 2011, we decided to internationalize our presence in order to break these communication barriers. We wanted to engage with other feminist organizations – our natural allies – to share what was really happening in the context of the Bolivarian Revolution. This was crucial, because even compañeras with whom we shared criteria struggled to understand the Venezuelan process.

That’s how our organization ended up at an international congress of the World March of Women in São Paulo; that was essentially our introduction to our feminist peers worldwide and the beginning of our active participation in that space. Our main objective was to connect our revolution with popular feminism around the world. We were not asking people to be for or against our revolution, which has many strengths but also shortcomings. Rather, we were asserting that we need neither tutelage nor a prescription from abroad. We do not need outsiders to dictate the correct line. What we need is sovereignty and, if possible, solidarity.

Venezuela has now been fully integrated into the Women’s March for ten years, and I serve as one of two continental representatives on the International Committee. This role is not just a recognition of my work but also an acknowledgment of what we are building here in Venezuela – our contributions to socialist feminism, to popular feminism, to internationalist feminism.

What is the situation of the feminist movement at the continental and national level?

One of the key lessons we have learned through our participation in the March is that we are part of something larger – feminism manifests in diverse ways across the continent and the world, but our movements share many things, including the effects of crises on working women.

We lived through extraordinary years when the “Marea Verde” [Green Tide, a pro-abortion movement] swept Latin America, with different expressions such as the Me Too movement, the March 8 feminist strikes, and “El violador eres tú” [the wave of anti-patriarchal street performances that used the slogan “You Are the Rapist”].

We witnessed a powerful global feminist surge. However, the enemy was not defeated and reacted with force. Today, we are facing a backlash from patriarchal, capitalist, racist, and colonialist forces working in concert. In the Women’s March, we refer to this as a system of multiple oppressions – they operate simultaneously and reinforce one another.

There are different manifestations of this reaction. For example, Javier Milei in Argentina is aggressively dismantling hard-won rights. On a different scale, we see the emergence of fascist forces in Venezuela, while the negotiations and concessions forced by the blockade-induced crisis are putting some of our rights at risk.

There has been a rise of fundamentalist evangelical Christianity in Venezuela and beyond. How does it affect women?

We are witnessing the global rise of religious fundamentalism. In Africa and the Arab world, this manifests as fundamentalist Islam, while in Latin America, there is a growing influence of Christian fundamentalist tendencies. Venezuela is no exception. Christian fundamentalism is on the rise here, and its primary target is women. These forces invoke the so-called traditional, heteronormative monogamous family – an idealized construct that never really existed – and blame societal problems on its supposed breakdown. These tendencies are gaining ground in every sphere of our society, and they are deeply troubling.

The global context of a capitalist crisis has economic, social, and environmental dimensions. Working-class women bear the brunt of the crisis worldwide. In Venezuela, the situation has been particularly painful due to the brutal impact of the imperialist blockade. How does this crisis, compounded by a global conservative backlash, affect working-class women here?

In the World March of Women, we do not speak of a single crisis; we speak of multiple crises. Life is complex, and these crises manifest in different ways. We are experiencing a crisis of capitalism and an environmental crisis, but in Venezuela, we also face a crisis triggered by US-led economic warfare.

It is well known that women bear the brunt of economic crises. However, as if that were not enough, the situation is compounded by a dominant narrative that implicitly or explicitly blames women’s rights for today’s crises. In moments of economic upheaval, conservative forces seize the opportunity to roll back hard-won advances, scapegoating women and demanding even greater sacrifices from them.

We saw this during the pandemic when everything came to a halt… except women’s work! Women had to redouble their efforts in caregiving at home, tend to patients in hospitals, manage community kitchens, and more. Despite this, the expectation remains that women should dedicate even more of their time to their families and communities.

This brings us to the challenges ahead. What are the major tasks for the feminist movement and the Bolivarian Revolution now?

As I mentioned earlier, we are experiencing a moment of setbacks at the global, continental, and national levels. In Venezuela, the feminist movement must come together and build a common agenda – one that is truly collective and based on consensus, rather than a mere compilation of different perspectives.

We must also strengthen the integration of popular feminism with other revolutionary movements. One crucial question we should be asking ourselves is: Where is the anti-patriarchal commune? The anti-patriarchal commune was supposed to be embedded in the communal project, yet it remains an unresolved task. Another question is: What happened to campesino feminism? We need to renew our alliances and ensure that feminism is deeply woven into the fabric of the revolution.

At the institutional level, the feminist movement achieved significant victories. We have progressive laws, a women’s ministry, women’s ombuds offices, and special courts. However, these gains must translate into lived realities. Many of our laws lack proper regulations, making enforcement difficult.

Finally, we must challenge cultural narratives that paint feminists as angry women who hate men. Feminism is not about hating men; it is about dismantling patriarchal structures.

International spaces like the World March of Women, Vía Campesina, Friends of the Earth, and ALBA Movements prioritize education and debate. Their work is grounded in popular and feminist pedagogy. This means they do not promote top-down lecture series but instead foster collective knowledge-building and strategy development spaces.

Currently, the Women’s March focuses on four key areas: the defense of bodies and territories, autonomy over our bodies and common goods, peace and demilitarization, and feminist economics as a transformative project. We are standing strong as we regroup – the enemy knows it, and we know it too.

Let’s circle back to the beginning of the interview, when you identified yourself with popular feminism. What is popular feminism?

Popular feminism emerges as an anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, anti-racist, and anti-colonial movement deeply connected with the grassroots. Over time, we have come to realize that we cannot position ourselves solely in opposition – we must also offer proposals and alternatives. That’s why we speak of “Buen Vivir” [good living], about the commons, and about a feminist economy, which, among other things, highlights the importance of social reproduction.

These proposals do not come from universities, though academic contributions can be valuable. Instead, popular feminism arises from the accumulated knowledge, reflections, and experiences of grassroots organizations and student movements.

One of the most beautiful realizations is that many of the things we imagine or project for the future already exist in some form. For instance, in envisioning sustainable production models, we find countless campesinas across the continent implementing agroecology at small, midsize, and even large scales.

For us, popular feminism is both reflection and action. It recognizes that we are part of the pueblo and that, as such, we can generate knowledge and change. This knowledge is as valid as anything certified by a university. It may have an even greater impact because it is linked to collective reflection and real, on-the-ground practices. That is the feminism we are building.

As a Venezuelan committed to the revolution, I’m deeply invested in participation and popular feminism is in sync with this. Popular feminism is in a permanent process of collective debate and construction. We think about it and shape it together, and we invite others to contribute as well. In fact, popular feminism is not just a movement for women, it is a proposal for the working people of the world.

In short, as Chávez would say, quoting Angela Davis: “If the revolution is not feminist, it will not be revolutionary.” We are committed to a revolution for all.

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Trump’s Détente with Venezuela

Trump’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine – “speak loudly AND carry a big stick” – has not been applied full force on Venezuela…as of yet. Instead the new administration appears to be testing a more nuanced approach. In his first administration, he succeeded in crashing the Venezuelan economy and creating misery among the populace but not in the goal of changing the “regime.”

Back in 2019, the Bolivarian Revolution, initiated by Hugo Chávez and carried forward by his successor, current Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, was teetering on collapse under Trump’s “maximum pressure” offensive. The economy had tanked, inflation was out of control, and the GDP was in freefall. Over 50 countries recognized Washington-anointed “interim president” Juan Guaidó’s parallel government.

In the interregnum between Trump administrations, Biden embraced his predecessor’s unilateral coercive economic measures, euphemistically called sanctions, but with minimal or temporary relief. He certified the incredulous charge that Venezuela posed an immediate and extraordinary threat to US national security, as Trump and Obama had before him. Biden also continued to recognize the inept and corrupt Guaidó as head-of-state, until Guaidó’s own opposition group booted him out.

Despite enormous challenges, Venezuela resisted and did so with some remarkable success, bringing us to the present.

Runup to the second Trump administration

In the runup to Trump’s inauguration, speculation on future US-Venezuela relations ran from cutting a peaceful-coexistence deal, to imposing even harsher sanctions, to even military intervention.

Reuters predicted that Trump’s choice of hardliner Marco Rubio at secretary of state augured an intensification of the regime-change campaign. Another rightwing Floridian of Cuban descent, Mauricio Claver-Carone was tapped as the special envoy for Latin America. He had been Trump’s senior director for Western Hemisphere affairs and credited with shaping Trump’s earlier aggressive stance toward Venezuela. Furthermore, on the campaign trail, Trump himself commented: “When I left, Venezuela was ready to collapse. We would have taken it over; we would have gotten to all that oil.”

At his Senate confirmation hearing on January 15, Rubio described Venezuela as a “narco-trafficking organization that has empowered itself of a nation state.” He was unanimously confirmed the very first day of the new administration.

The supposedly opposition Democrats all stampeded in his support, although Rubio severely criticized the previous Biden administration for being too soft on Venezuela. Rubio’s criticism was largely unwarranted because, except for minor tweaks, Biden had seamlessly continued the hybrid war against Venezuela.

Grenell Trumps Rubio

The first visit abroad by a Trump administration official was made by Ric Grenell, presidential envoy for special missions. Grenell briefly served in Trump’s first administration as acting director of national intelligence, becoming the first openly gay person in a Cabinet-level position.

Grenell flew to Caracas and posed for a photo-op, shaking hands with President Maduro on January 31. This was a noteworthy step away from hostility and towards rapprochement between two countries that have not had formal diplomatic relations since 2019.

The day after the Grenell visit, Rubio embarked on an uninspiring tour of rightwing Latin American countries. That same day, General License 41 allowing Chevron to operate in Venezuela automatically renewed, which was a development that Rubio had advocated against.

Diplomacy of dignity

Maduro entered negotiations with Grenell with a blend of strategic engagement and assertive resistance, aiming to navigate Venezuela’s economic challenges while maintaining sovereignty. The approach had win-win outcomes, although the spin in the respective countries was quite different.

Grenell claimed a “win” from the meeting with the release of six “American hostages” without giving anything in return. Venezuela, for its part, got rid of a half dozen “mercenaries.” Neither country has released the names of all the former detainees.

Grenell took a victory lap for getting Venezuela to accept back migrants who had left the country, a key Trump priority. Maduro welcomed them as part of his Misión Vuelta a la Patria (Return to the Homeland Program), which has repatriated tens of thousands since its inception in 2018.

Trump’s special envoy boasted that Venezuela picked up the migrants and flew them back home for free. Maduro was pleased that the US-sanctioned national airline Conviasa was allowed to land in the US and transport the citizens back in dignity. Congratulating the pilots and other workers, Maduro said: “The US tried to finish off Conviasa, yet here it is, strong.”

Evolution of imperialist strategy

Trump’s special representative for Venezuela in his first administration, Elliot Abrams, believes his former boss sold out the shop. He criticized Grenell’s visit as functioning to help legitimize Maduro as Venezuela’s rightful president, which it did.

In contrast, Robert O’Brien believes, “Grenell scored a significant diplomatic victory.” What is noteworthy is that O’Brien replaced John Bolton as Trump’s national security advisor in 2019 and had worked with Abrams as co-architect of the “maximum pressure” campaign against Venezuela, yet now acknowledges it is time for a shift.

Speaking from experience, O’Brien commented: “Maximum economic sanctions have not changed the regime in Venezuela.” He now advocates: “Keeping sanctions against Venezuela in place, while at the same time, granting American and partner nation companies licenses.”

According to Grenell, Trump no longer seeks regime change in Venezuela, but wants to focus on advancing US interests, namely facilitating deportations of migrants, while halting irregular migration to the US and preventing inflation of gas prices.

Ricardo Vaz of Venezuelanalysis suggests that Trump’s strategy is to adroitly use sanctions. Rather than driving Venezuela into the arms of China and Russia, Trump wants to incrementally erode sovereignty, compel sweetheart deals with foreign corporations such as Chevron, and eventually capture control of its oil industry.

Venezuela’s successes force imperial accommodation

Not only did “maximum pressure” fail to achieve imperial goals in the past, but the Bolivarian Revolution’s accomplishments today have necessitated a more “pragmatic” approach by the US.

Venezuela has resolutely developed resilience against sanctions, achieving an extraordinary economic turnaround with one of the highest GDP growth rates in the hemisphere. Venezuelan oil production is at its highest level since 2019. The oil export market has been diversified with China as the primary customer, although the US is still prominent in second place.

However, if Chevron operations in Venezuela get shuttered, that would take a bite out of the recovery. Trump threatened on February 26 to withdrawal the company’s license, departing from the initial engagement approach. This was seen as a short-term concession to foreign policy hardliners in exchange for domestic support. But even then, the license’s six-month wind-down period offered room for the two governments to negotiate their future oil relationship. On March 1, the Office of Foreign Assets Control automatically reissued the license for another six months. But then on March 4, the wind-down period was reduced to a short 30 days. This could mark a turn back in the direction of regime change.

The Venezuelan government is incrementally mitigating the economic dominance by the oil sector. It has also made major strides towards food self-sufficiency, which is an under-reported victory that no other petrostate has ever accomplished.

It has reformed the currency exchange system reducing rate volatility,although a recent devaluation is worrisome. Tax policy too has become more efficient.

Further, the collapse of the US-backed opposition leaves Washington with a less effective bench to carry its water. The opposition coalition is divided over whether to boycott or participate in the upcoming May 25 elections. The USAID debacle has now left the squabbling insurrectionists destitute. (Venezuela never received any humanitarian aid.).

Washington still officially recognizes the long defunct 2015 National Assembly as the “legitimate government” of Venezuela. At the same time, Trump inherited the baggage of González Urrutia as the “lawful president-elect” (but not as “the president”), leaving the US with two parallel faux governments to juggle along with the actual one. Lacking a popular base in Venezuela, González Urrutia abjectly whimpered: “As I recently told Secretary of State Marco Rubio: We are counting on you to help us solve our problems.”

Although US sanctions will undoubtedly continue, Venezuela’s adaptations blunt their effectiveness. Venezuela’s resistance, bolstered by its natural oil and other reserves, have allowed that Latin American country to force some accommodation from the US. In contrast, the imperialists are going for the jugular with resistance-strong but natural resource-poor Cuba.

The future of détente

Shifting political forces can endanger the fragile détente. Indeed, on February 26, Trump announced that oil licenses would be revoked, supposedly because Venezuela was not accepting migrants back fast enough. The Florida Congressional delegation, it is rumored, threatened to withhold approval of his prized Reconciliation Bill, if Trump did not cancel.

Clearly there is opposition from his party, both at the official and grassroots levels, against détente with Venezuela. As for the Democrats, elements have distinguished themselves from Trump by outflanking him from the right. The empire’s newspaper of record, The New York Times, recently ran a piece calling for military intervention in Venezuela.

According to Carlos Ron, former Venezuelan deputy foreign minister, the issue of détente between Washington and Caracas goes beyond this particular historical moment and even beyond the specifics of Venezuela to a fundamental contradiction: the empire seeks domination while the majority of the world’s peoples and nations seek self-determination. Until that is resolved, the struggle continues.

Roger D. Harris is with the Venezuela Solidarity Network, the Task Force on the Americas, and the US Peace Council.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelan editorial staff.

Source: Pressenza

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Constructing an Echo Chamber: A Legacy of Media Bias Towards Chávez’s Venezuela

Over the past quarter-century, the United States has spared no effort to overthrow Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution. The ceaseless regime-change attacks, besides their near-universal bipartisan backing, have likewise benefitted from uncritical support from the Western media.

In this article, researcher Richard Balzano takes stock of imperialist policies and the “echo chamber” formed by the political and media establishments to sustain anti-Venezuela multi-pronged warfare.

Venezuela’s Bolivarian government has been the target of economic warfare, subversion, failed coup attempts, persistent efforts at regime change, and fifth-generation warfare, championed by the United States as it scrambles to retain hegemony in the hemisphere. Such actions are illegal under various tenets of international law, and yet they go largely unchallenged by Western governments and they receive bipartisan support in Washington, where policymakers have and continue to openly call for and actively pursue regime change in Venezuela. This was and remains possible in part because of a legacy of complicit media hostility towards the Bolivarian government. Hugo Chávez’s direct challenge to neoliberalism and his brand of socialism “represent[ed] perhaps the most important political challenge to the status quo anywhere in the world.”^[sup]1[/sup] In response, Washington channeled millions of dollars to fuel opposition movements—acts of subversion—through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), USAID, and other NGOs, asphyxiated Venezuela with sanctions, and actively supported coup attempts on both Chávez and Maduro.^[sup]2[/sup] The fleeting change of government during the 2002 coup was not recognized by the international community as a legitimate transition of government at that time, but the several attempts to oust Maduro by force and through non-recognition have been ordained by most Western governments. This can be attributed to US economic leverage and the decades-long marketing campaign carried out by Washington and the complicit Western media directed against Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution.^[sup]3[/sup] Diligent journalism on US-Venezuelan relations retains space on the media periphery, but its reach does not extend to the majority of Americans.

Washington engaged the Bolivarian Revolution in fourth-generation asymmetrical warfare in its efforts to shape the perspectives of not only the public at home and abroad, but those of US policymakers as well.^[sup]4[/sup] Chávez enhanced participatory democracy in Venezuela, and both he and Nicolás Maduro retained office through the ballot box,^[sup]5[/sup] but Washington and mainstream Western media outlets upheld the State Department’s narrative that Venezuela is an undemocratic nation led by human rights-abusing authoritarian caudillos and run aground by socialism.^[sup]6[/sup] Persistent media narratives adhere to Washington’s liberal imperialist framework in which US-led destabilization efforts are framed as acts of humanitarianism the West can rally behind, which has fostered a climate in which regime change is publicly palatable.^[sup]7[/sup] In this context, the Western media has been a collaborative arm of Washington’s asymmetrical war, sustaining hostility towards two Bolivarian presidents over three US administrations in what has now become a policy of permanent coup.

The W. Bush administration channeled millions of dollars to opposition groups in Venezuela through the NED, USAID, and the Office of Transition Initiatives to undermine the Chavez administration through its “democratic intervention” model.^[sup]8[/sup] The budgets of these agencies increased exponentially during W’s tenure, and “funding began flowing into large and small organizations that all shared a common characteristic: aversion to President Chávez.”^[sup]9[/sup] Through these subversive efforts, Washington empowered opposition leaders like Leopoldo Lopez and Carlos Fernandez, groomed future opposition leaders like Juan Guaido, courted former president Carlos Andres Perez and then-prospective presidential usurper Pedro Carmona. Anti-Bolivarian networks united “unlikely allies” in Accíon Democrática, COPEI, and Venezuela’s largest labor union Confederación de Trabajadores Venezolanos to assist in the 2002 coup attempt, to mount the 2002-2003 PDVSA oil strike, and to promote subsequent referendum elections under a barrage of Venezuelan anti-Chávez media fervor. Chávez nonetheless prevailed with 59% of the vote.^[sup]10[/sup] The “ultra right-wing think tank” Center for Security Policy prepared a May 2005 report titled “What to Do About Venezuela” that recommended unilateral regime change alongside an “information warfare bonanza,” under the premise that “Chávez is a dictator who consorts with terrorists and threatens American interests, and therefore must be removed from power as soon as possible.”^[sup]11[/sup] American subversion in Venezuela makes Russiagate seem like child’s play, but no introspective comparison is permitted in the mainstream media due to deeply ingrained and perhaps obligatory adherence to American exceptionalism and innocence within the framework of US liberal imperialism. To the contrary, the slightest protest is hyperbolized in the Western media to represent the Bolivarian government’s alleged illegitimacy while disregarding the de facto evidence of tolerance for civil society.

Washington recalibrated its policies to challenge Chávez economically and diplomatically, constructing what Condoleeza Rice depicted as “a united international front against Venezuela.”^[sup]12[/sup] On the economic end, Washington “impos[ed] every possible unilateral sanction on the Venezuelan government that it could conjure up,” while imposing economic blockades and leveraging regional trade partners.^[sup]13[/sup] On the diplomatic end, the W. Bush administration set a precedent for future administrations in its efforts to isolate Venezuela’s Bolivarian government from the international community through unsubstantiated accusations of human rights abuses, dictatorial undemocratic authoritarianism, corrupting elections, supporting terrorism, nuclear ambitions, and complicity with drug trafficking.^[sup]14[/sup] It might be hard to locate a precise moment for a shift towards reciprocal antagonism between the US and Venezuela’s Bolivarian government, but by 2006 the relationships were well defined; Chávez delivered his notorious 2006 speech at the United Nations in which he challenged US interventionism and eluded to George W. Bush as “the devil,” suggesting in dark humor that the podium smelled like sulfur after Bush had presented,^[sup]15[/sup] while the W. Bush administration formally redefined Venezuela as threat to national security when updating its National Security Strategy that same year, depicting Chávez as “a demagogue awash in oil money… undermining democracy and seeking to destabilize the region.”^[sup]16[/sup]

Western media culture has been historically conditioned to challenge the economics of the Bolivarian Revolution. Sociologist William Domhoff acknowledged that “the media cover events in such a way that America’s diplomatic aims are always honorable, [and] corporate involvement overseas is necessary and legitimate,”^[sup]17[/sup] adding that within the complicated web of media ownership and consolidation, topics often, but not always, reflect corporate interests.^[sup]18[/sup] The media generally depicts neoliberalism and elite consensus as “common sense,” with alternatives to the status quo and ideas of radical change presented as dangerous and lacking credibility, if not sophomoric.^[sup]19[/sup] Chávez’s brand of anti-imperialist 21st Century Socialism certainly confronted the neoliberal model from atop the world’s largest oil reserves, stirring the nonaligned pot, and in this context MacLeod comments that “it is unsurprising to see highly negative coverage” of Chávez.^[sup]20[/sup]

The mainstream US media has grown subservient to Washington’s foreign policy objectives. Domhoff argues that the US media is most influential in areas of foreign policy, “where most people have little information or interest, and are predisposed to agree with top leaders out of patriotism and a fear of whatever is strange or foreign.”^[sup]21[/sup] At the surface, US media sourcing and foreign policy perspectives often originate from think tanks like the Brookings Institution, the Heritage Foundation, and the American Enterprise Institute, each with its own bias and patronage, and from topical experts, the latter ranging from scholars and authors carefully selected to reinforce an agenda to Rendon-type panelists, from the synchronized rhetoric of Benador-prepped government officials to expatriate economists educated in the US and relieved of their positions by progressive anti-imperialist movements getting in the last word in the Western press.^[sup]22[/sup] In the context of Venezuela, this formula plays out consistently, as the Bolivarian opposition is provided a monopoly on mainstream media exposure outside of Venezuela.^[sup]23[/sup]

Chávez’s left-leaning policies and relationship with Cuba were used to rally Cold War phobias, and challenges to neoliberalism are conflated with challenges to capitalism on the whole.^[sup]24[/sup] Herman and Chomsky posited anticommunism as “a national religion and control mechanism,” and one of the five pillars of their media propaganda model,^[sup]25[/sup] while MacLeod adds that the media contains an anti-socialist filter that “has the effect of tarring journalists arguing against the conservative consensus as untrustworthy, anti-American or traitorous.”^[sup]26[/sup] As politicians fear being “soft” on voter-sensitive issues like crime or foreign policy, so too are journalists confined to similar dynamics of conformity when reporting, especially communism.^[sup]27[/sup] For media consumers, this red scare phobia links socialism to communism to authoritarian dictatorial behavior, with little evidence required to substantiate the accusation and its suggestive connotations in the public forum.^[sup]28[/sup]

Washington has little evidence to substantiate its claims about Venezuela, so they rely on such tried and tested phobias. Gregory Shupak’s survey of the use of “regime” demonstrates that the word has been manipulated to imply “that the government to which the label is applied is undemocratic, even tyrannical,” and that “[c]alling a government a ‘regime’ suggests a lack of legitimacy, with the implication that its ousting… would serve humanitarian and democratic ends.”^[sup]29[/sup] Shupak notes that “regime” is reserved for states out of Washington’s favor.^[sup]30[/sup] Gabriel Hetland laments that “[t]he idea that Venezuela is authoritarian has been repeated ad nauseam for nearly the entire eighteen-year period of Chavista rule,”^[sup]31[/sup] despite decades of electoral victories in what the Carter Center deemed “the best elections in the world.”^[sup]32[/sup] That the opposition was able to initiate recall referendums, obstruct Chávez’s policies, and regularly engage in slander is evidence of the Bolivarian government’s tolerance for civil society, but there is no place for this angle in mainstream media narratives.

If communist authoritarian dictatorial rule was not enough to stoke public opinion,^[sup]33[/sup] Washington had other means of discrediting Chávez’s image: terrorism. Decades prior, Reagan’s Central American public relations teams’ pollings concluded that negative connotations associated with “communism” were less than those of “terrorism,”^[sup]34[/sup] and it stands to reason that neoconservatives reemerging under W. Bush may have recalled this lesson in public opinion and were quick to brand Chávez a terrorist. Political Scientist Peter Smith writes that “[a]fter 9/11 the war on terror superseded, and enveloped the war on drugs… [and i]nternational antidrug efforts derived their ultimate rationale from their contribution to the war on terror,” adding that, despite considerable evidence to the contrary, Venezuela was accused by Washington of trafficking drugs without evidence, “a wholly political maneuver, defined within the context of the war on terror.”^[sup]35[/sup] After courting unsubstantiated stories of terrorist training camps and nuclear ambitions, the W. Bush administration’s intelligence officials confronted with evidence simply argued that they could not prove the assertions were untrue.^[sup]36[/sup]

Omission is a powerful media tool in crafting the authoritarian image of Venezuela. On the whole, there is a code of conduct for Western journalists and media outlets covering Latin America. Michael Parenti observes four rules governing the Western media’s “demonization of … forces not conducive to American state and corporate interests”:

An absence of any positive comments on democratic or economic reforms; …[s]ympathetic portrayal of the rich suffering oppression; ….silence on the negative effects of US policy and violence in the region; …[and] an image of economic adversity due to mismanagement of the economy that is inherent to socialism.”^[sup]37[/sup]

Western media coverage of Venezuela hits the mark on all counts, as democratic mobilization and poverty reduction are ignored or misrepresented while the impacts of US sanctions are also ignored, or credited without explanation to socialism, economic incompetence, corruption, and authoritarianism.^[sup]38[/sup] Justin Delacour identifies an element of omission in which left-wing governments’ economic policies are deemed authoritarian, void of “meaningful discussion of the social and political ramifications of unfettered private power” and unwilling to consider whether “unfettered private economic power is compatible with democracy” at all.^[sup]39[/sup] Delacour’s analysis of media coverage of Venezuela observed about 95 percent of sampled articles were hostile towards Venezuela, concluding that “U.S. commentaries about Venezuela serve as little more than a campaign of indoctrination against a democratic political project that challenges U.S. political and economic domination of South America.”^[sup]40[/sup] Critical mainstream media coverage of Washington’s consistent regime change policy and efforts are obsolete.^[sup]41[/sup]

Misinformation is rampant, but redactions, if made at all, come months later, obscured in less frequented back pages.^[sup]42[/sup] The NYT quietly redacted its published assertions that the Maduro government set fire to aid trucks at the Colombian border, one month after both the initial publication and evidence to the contrary surfaced. Redactions to articles critical of Chávez are in abundance. Francisco Toro, founding editor of Caracas Chronicles and former writer for the Guardian and Washington Post, produced several pieces of disinformation in February 2014, but Toro’s NYT op-ed was addressed same-day by CUNY professor Ian J. Seda-Irizarry. The Times’ redaction was nominal, and Toro reluctantly conceded his inaccuracies via a personal Twitter (now X) account that is no longer active.^[sup]43[/sup]

Another less nefarious institutional media shortcoming lies in the dynamics of foreign correspondence in Venezuela, producing ideological alignment among journalists both right and left. MacLeod’s survey of foreign correspondents in Venezuela demonstrates that many came from socioeconomic backgrounds predisposed to liberal economics, some had limited functional knowledge of the Spanish language, and all resided in “highly polarized” upper-middle class neighborhoods in Caracas and associated within an ideological “bubble” that limited their perspectives.^[sup]44[/sup] While MacLeod cites both verbal and physical hostilities towards journalists covering Chavista events positively, Lee Salter comments: “If you ever go there, you cannot mention, in English, that you think the Bolivarian Revolution is anything other than some Nazi Blitzkrieg over Venezuela.”^[sup]45[/sup]

The US media is not alone in its efforts to demonize the Bolivarian Revolution. Research by Lee Salter and David Weltman demonstrates that reporting by the BBC “falls short of its legal commitment to impartiality, truth and accuracy;” citing similar predispositions and isolative shortcomings as MacLeod’s research, Salter and Weltman observe implications of illegitimacy and demonizations as extreme as comparing Chávez to Hitler, and note less than 1 percent of surveyed articles between 1998 and 2008 mention any positive strides made by the Chávez government.^[sup]46[/sup] Ricardo Vaz’s assessment of the Guardian’s coverage takes a highly critical tone, questioning the credibility of polling data and unconditional favoritism towards the opposition.^[sup]47[/sup] On uniformity, MacLeod concludes that “virtually all the entire catalog of news and opinions on Venezuela in the international media is sufficiently similar as to seem plausible that it was written by the same person.”^[sup]48[/sup]

The media’s reach in building consensus not only extends to citizens but policymakers themselves. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) within the Library of Congress provides policymakers with contextual reports of topics of importance, but these reports formed an echo chamber for State Department talking points and mainstream media depictions of the Bolivarian project. The CRS produced seventeen versions “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy” from 2003 to 2009, each growing in content and length over time. Analysis of said reports reveals that the report relied heavily on mainstream and right-wing media outlets over substantive reporting and authentic research, in turn legitimizing and propagating State Department talking points that vilify Chávez and the Bolivarian project to a specific audience of US policymakers.

The analysis surveyed the reports’ citations and identified the number of sources from “commonly accessible media” (CAM), which is defined as major Western media networks and online publications, media that would appear on the first page of search engine results, and syndicated stories from less common journalistic databases. The Economist was included in this category, but stories from The Economist’s Intelligence Unit were not. Think tanks, trade-specific publications like Oil and Gas Journal and Platts Oilgram News, and sources like Oxford Analytica and Latin News were not included. Venezuela Analysis, however, was surprisingly cited to supply contrasting viewpoints to Washington’s opinions, and was thus included in this category. The net was cast wide and was further broken down into conservative, neutral, and progressive media due to the near-uniform hostility throughout the media nexus towards Chávez and the Bolivarian project. A sub-category was added, however, for the Miami Herald, which MacLeod identifies as “extremely conservative”^[sup]49[/sup] and which harbors much contempt for Latin America’s left. Not surprisingly, the Herald is featured considerably more than any other sources in the reports.

Of the 1809 total citations throughout these reports, CAM outlets were cited 991 times. Of those 991 citations, the Miami Herald was cited 346 times, which equates to 35 percent of commonly accessible media citations and just over 19 percent of all citations. The Herald appeared in 25 percent of 2003 report’s total citations. In two versions of the 2005 report, CAM was cited 33 and 44 times within 59 and 71 overall citations, respectively. The lone 2009 version of the report and the 2003-2009 summary report, both issued in 2009, cited common media 112 and 122 times within 185 and 202 overall citations, respectively.

The reports are amended and altered but never rewritten in their entirety. The introductory “Background” section, however, does not change throughout the reports, and it draws from two articles in the ultra-conservative National Review: William S. Prillman’s “The Castro in Caracas: Venezuelan Strongman Hugo Chavez, in Fidel’s Image” (April 3, 2003) and Stephen Johnson’s “Venezuela Erupting” (March 5, 2004). This section consistently includes the following passage:

From the outset, critics have raised concerns about Chávez and his government. They fear that he is moving toward authoritarian rule and point to his domination of most government institutions. Some argue that Chávez has replaced the country’s multiparty democracy with a political system that revolves around himself, in essence a cult of personality; others point to Chávez’s open admiration of Fidel Castro and close relations with Cuba as a disturbing sign.^[sup]50[/sup]

The critics, of course, are Prillman and Johnson of the National Review.

The CRS reports consistently defend the “democratization efforts” of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Information from NED’s website is referenced to counter Mark Weisbrot’s 2004 testimony before congress in which he argued that the US was undermining democracy in Venezuela.

Western media outlets are combatants in Washington’s fourth-generation asymmetrical war on the Bolivarian project. Despite four election victories and unwavering popular support among sectors of Venezuelan society, the media asserted that the Chávez government was an illegitimate authoritarian dictatorship and threat to global security. The “evidence” to support its claims lay in the web of disinformation spun by themselves. The amount of secondary reporting cited by the CRS exposes the circular nature of the echo chamber surrounding US policy towards Venezuela, and raises several alarming questions. Does CRS “research” aim to provide policymakers with information so as to generate informed policy, or do CRS reports provide policymakers with an official narrative, preferred talking points, and insights into the (dis)information being consumed by their constituents?

Congressional Research Service

“Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy” Reports, 2003-2009

Congressional Research Service Reports (Chronological)

Sullivan, Mark P. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. December 9, 2003. Accessed March 24, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20031209_RS20978_b9612d9e17bc792bf5da4071d4c4c25a035ff75d.pdf.

Sullivan, Mark P. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. July 17, 2004. Accessed March 24, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20040717_RL32488_8b25c4381385492e4f516edf57a18d6c8cc5479c.pdf.

Sullivan, Mark P. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. April 1, 2005. Accessed March 24, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20050401_RL32488_6fe3a6534b668b075a9cfc1654132b699d98692f.pdf.

Sullivan, Mark P. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. May 18, 2005. Accessed March 24, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20050518_RL32488_59b9810f00e21ad904766223f95fcb9f3e5d2237.pdf.

Sullivan, Mark P. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. August 24, 2005. Accessed March 24, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20050824_RL32488_7a4c405d8d8bed37cb3acce19f884c456209f336.pdf.

Sullivan, Mark P. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. September 23, 2005. Accessed March 24, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20050923_RL32488_e07b273dba1a543e65635ef6b84bf4f5fcb5609a.pdf.

Sullivan, Mark P. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. November 22, 2005. Accessed March 24, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20051122_RL32488_c4af0c9377358d70e67bc1388edb19ce959aa1df.pdf.

Sullivan, Mark P. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. January 17, 2006. Accessed March 24, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20060117_RL32488_d2bf0400849d08a7008778363a746cc61ca66e8e.pdf.

Sullivan, Mark P. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. March 10, 2006. Accessed March 24, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20060310_RL32488_f790fe5f656ccb5b36106b125d1b0f91c712876f.pdf.

Sullivan, Mark P. and Nelson Olhero. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. June 8, 2007. Accessed March 24, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20070608_RL32488_62f7562a398c9d5cf8b471380bbe69f652082422.pdf.

Sullivan, Mark P. and Nelson Olhero. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. September 4, 2007. Accessed March 24, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20070904_RL32488_8e42dddec23588d046fae9ca37f8456c4cb9a91c.pdf.

Sullivan, Mark P. and Nelson Olhero. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. January 11, 2008. Accessed March 24, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20080111_RL32488_3ae18b6013684bdb215cc8ab0bb789ca491c44db.pdf.

Sullivan, Mark P. and Nelson Olhero. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. April 15, 2008. Accessed March 26, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20080415_RL32488_060fa767a9edcaa42481ad5fe961bca3d13a5a89.pdf.

Sullivan, Mark P. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. August 1, 2008. Accessed March 27, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20080801_RL32488_22270e3e0a173cde208d2e63a05d426619b25f55.pdf.

Sullivan, Mark P. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. October 10, 2008. Accessed March 27, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20081010_RL32488_6aa55df30a6d309260e509558e45b147ca15638c.pdf.

Sullivan, Mark P. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. February 5, 2009. Accessed March 27, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20080205_RL32488_3e42e9f19a8b62c5b356b38bb8504f272ab1da56.pdf.

NAME REDACTED. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy, 2003-2009.” Congressional Research Service. July 28, 2009. Accessed March 27, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20090728_RL32488_e780177bdc3a8cf9aa6ba912a447edc3858fa29d.pdf.

Notes

1 Alan MacLeod, Bad News from Venezuela: Twenty Years of Fake News and Misreporting (New York: Routledge, 2018),2.

2 Eva Golinger’s The Chávez Code: Cracking US Intervention in Venezuela (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2006) is dedicated entirely to this subject. See also: William Blum, Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2005), 86; Eva Golinger, Bush vs. Chávez: Washington’s War on Venezuela (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2008), 12-15, 24-31; Ed Vulliamy, ‘Venezuela Coup Linked to Bush Team’, Guardian News, 21 April 2002, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/21/usa.venezuela.

3 Dan Cohen and Max Blumenthal, “The Making of Juan Guaido: How the US Regime Change Laboratory Created Venezuela’s Coup Leader,” Gray Zone, January 29, 2019, https://thegrayzone.com/2019/01/29/the-making-of-juan-guaido-how-the-us-regime-change-laboratory-created-venezuelas-coup-leader/; Benjamin Keen and Keith Haynes, A History of Latin America, Volume 2: Independence to the Present, 9th ed. (Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage, 2013), 558-559; Alexander Main, “United States’ Hand in Undermining Democracy in Venezuela,” North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), May 17, 2018, https://nacla.org/news/2018/05/18/united-states’-hand-undermining-democracy-venezuela.

4 Golinger, Bush vs. Chávez, 48, 111-114; Peter P. Perla, Albert A. Nofi, and Michael C. Markowitz, “Wargaming Fourth-Generation Warfare (U),” Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), September 2006, 11-16, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0014752.a2.pdf.

5 Maria Pilar Garcia-Guadilla, “The Incorporation of Popular Sectors and Social Movements in Venezuelan Twenty-First-Century Socialism,” in Eduardo Silva and Federico M. Rossi, Reshaping the Political Arena in Latin America: From Resisting Neoliberalism to the Second Incorporation (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018), 60-77; Golinger, Bush vs. Chávez, 54-55; MacLeod, Bad News from Venezuela, 16-25; Jennifer McCoy, “Venezuela: Leading a New Trend in Latin America?,” Revista: Harvard Review of Latin America 8, no. 1. (Fall 2008): 52-56. Accessed February 17, 2019, and ongoing via PDF. https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/venezuela-leading-new-trend-latin-america.

6 Justin Delacour, “The Op-Ed Assassination of Hugo Chávez,” Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, November 1, 2005, accessed March 25, 2019, https://fair.org/home/the-op-ed-assassination-of-hugo-chvez/; Golinger, Bush vs. Chávez, 53-54; United States Defense Intelligence Agency, A Primer on the Future Threat: The Decades Ahead, 1999-2020 (The Purple Book), July 1999, 106, accessed February 13, 2019 via NSA Archive at George Washington University, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4895711-Defense-Intelligence-Agency-A-Primer-on-the.

7 Lauren Carasik, “Obama Continues Bush’s Policies in Venezuela,” Al Jazeera (English), published April 8, 2014, accessed March 2, 2019, http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/4/nicolas-maduro-onobamaandbushspoliciesinvenezuela.html; Main, “United States’ Hand in Undermining Democracy in Venezuela.”

8 Golinger, Bush vs. Chávez, 21-23.

9 Ibid., 24.

10 Blum, Rogue State, 215-217; Cohen and Blumenthal, “The Making of Juan Guaido: How the US Regime Change Laboratory Created Venezuela’s Coup Leader;” Carasik, “Obama Continues Bush’s Policies in Venezuela;” Golinger, Bush vs. Chávez, 15-45, 54-55; Jake Johnston,“What the Wikileaks Cables Say about Leopoldo Lopez,” Center for Economic Policy and Research, February 21, 2014, accessed February 27, 2019, http://cepr.net/blogs/the-americas-blog/what-the-wikileaks-cables-say-about-leopoldo-lopez. Golinger presents evidence that during the strike, PDVSA equipment was sabotaged by INTESA, the information and tech company handling electronic operations for PDVSA. INTESA was a division of Science Applications International Corp., a US company and government contractor with historic CIA connections.

11 Golinger, Bush vs. Chávez, 53-57.

12 Quoted in Golinger, Bush vs. Chávez, 47.

13 Golinger, Bush vs. Chávez, 23, 46-47.

14 Golinger, Bush vs. Chávez, 23, 47-48.

15 Hugo Chávez Frias, Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, “Statement by H.E. Hugo Chavez Frias, President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, at the 61st United Nations General Assembly, September 20, 2006” United Nations, https://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/pdfs/venezuela-e.pdf.

16 Quoted in Golinger, Bush vs. Chávez, 62, 66-67. See also United States State Department, “The National Security Strategy of the United States,” March 16, 2006, http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2006/.

17 William Domhoff, Who Rules America?: Power, Politics, and Social Change, 5th ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2006), 124-125, 127.

18 Domhoff, Who Rules America?, 124-125.

19 MacLeod, Bad News from Venezuela, 2, 4-5.

20 MacLeod, Bad News from Venezuela, 5.

21 Domhoff, Who Rules America?, 119.

22 Justin Delacour, “Framing Venezuela,” Counterpunch, June 1, 2005, accessed March 27, 2019, https://www.counterpunch.org/2005/06/01/framing-venezuela/; Domhoff, Who Rules America?, 124-125, 127. While Delacour makes special note of whose expertise is not sought by the media, an example of “last word” or “final say” dynamics can be found in a 2008 exchange in Foreign Affairs between former Venezuelan National Assembly chief economist Francisco Rodriguez and Chávez appointed US Ambassador Bernardo Alvarez Herrera. Rodriguez’s piece in FA argued diligently that Chávez’s policies have not helped the poor, that poverty had not been reduced during his tenure, and that “[n]either official statistics nor independent estimates show any evidence that Chávez has reoriented state priorities to benefit the poor.” Citing statistics without sources, his condemnation of the Chávez government feels personal. FA (almost) diligently published Herrera’s articulate rebuttal to Rodriguez’s piece, but buried it in the closing pages of subsequent issue, but not without tipping Rodriguez off, giving him the last word to his own critique. See Bernardo Alvarez Herrera and Francisco Rodríguez, “How Chávez Has Helped the Poor (with Reply),” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 4 (July-August, 2008): 158-162, accessed February 17, 2019 via subscription, and continually via PDF, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20032729; Francisco Rodriguez, “An Empty Revolution: The Unfilled Promises of Hugo Chávez;” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (March-April 2008), accessed on February 22, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2008-03-02/empty-revolution.

23 Delacour, “Framing Venezuela.”

24 Delacour, “The Op-Ed Assassination of Hugo Chávez.”

25 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, updated ed. (New York: Pantheon, 2002), 2, 29-31.

26 MacLeod, Bad News from Venezuela, 6.

27 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 2, 29-31.

28 Golinger, Bush vs. Chávez, 49-67; Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 2, 29-31.

29 Gregory Shupak, “A ‘Regime’ Is a Government at Odds with the US Empire,” Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, August 20, 2018, accessed March 31, 2019, https://fair.org/home/a-regime-is-a-government-at-odds-with-the-us-empire/.

30 Shupak, “A ‘Regime’ Is a Government at Odds with the US Empire.”

31 Gabriel Hetland,“Why is Venezuela Spiraling Out of Control,” North American Congress on Latin America, Published April 28, 2017, Accessed April 2, 2019, https://nacla.org/news/2018/05/18/why-venezuela-spiraling-out-control.

32 Jimmy Carter, “30 Years of The Carter Center (Sept. 11, 2011),” 43:34, The Carter Center, published September 21, 2012, youtube.com/watch?v=VPKPw4t6Si….

33 One of hundreds, if not thousands of examples comes from Naim Moises and Francisco Toro, describing Bolivarian Venezuela as a criminal state in which “the country has experienced a toxic mix of wantonly destructive policy, escalating authoritarianism, and kleptocracy, all under a level of Cuban influence that often resembles an occupation.” In Naim Moises and Francisco Toro, “Venezuela’s Suicide: Lessons From a Failed State,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-america/2018-10-15/venezuelas-suicide.

34 Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 230.

35 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 317-319.

36 Quoted in Golinger, Bush vs. Chavez, 62, 66-67.

37 Michael Parenti, Inverting Reality: the Politics of News Media (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 186. See also: Macleod, Bad News from Venezuela, 6.

38 Golinger, Bush vs. Chavez, 22-23.

39 Delacour, “Framing Venezuela.”

40 Delacour, “The Op-Ed Assassination of Hugo Chávez”; Salter and Weltman make similar findings within the BBC’s reporting, noted in the coming pages. See Lee Salter, “A Decade of Propaganda? The BBC’s Reporting on Venezuela,” VenezuelaAnalysis.com, published December 14, 2009, accessed March 29, 2019, https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/5003; and Lee Salter and Dave Weltman, “Class, Nationalism, and News: The BBC’s Reporting of Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution,” The International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics 7, no. 3. (2011), http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/16225, http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/16225/21/MCP_7%203_2_Salter%20art.pdf.

41 Main, “United States’ Hand in Undermining Democracy in Venezuela.”

42 Main, “United States’ Hand in Undermining Democracy in Venezuela.”

43 See Ian J. Seda-Irizarry, “Letter to New York Times: Correct Francisco Toro’s Error on Venezuela,” North American Congress on Latin America, February 26, 2014, accessed March 25, 2019, https://nacla.org/blog/2014/2/26/letter-new-york-times-correct-francisco-toros-error-venezuela; and

Francisco Toro, “Rash Repression in Venezuela,” New York Times, February 24, 2014, accessed March 25, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/opinion/rash-repression-in-venezuela.html.

44 MacLeod, Bad News from Venezuela, 104-114.

45 Quoted in MacLeod, Bad News from Venezuela, 112. Emphasis in original quote.

46 Salter, “A Decade of Propaganda?”; Salter and Weltman, “Class, Nationalism, and News.”

47 Ricardo Vaz, “The Guardian’s Propaganda on Venezuela: All You Need To Know,” VenezuelaAnalysis.com, July 29, 2017, accessed March 30, 2019, https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/13269.

48 MacLeod, Bad News from Venezuela, 110-111.

49 MacLeod, Bad News from Venezuela, 110.

50 Mark P. Sullivan, “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, 2, July 17, 2004, accessed March 24, 2019, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20040717_RL32488_8b25c4381385492e4f516edf57a18d6c8cc5479c.pdf.

Richard Balzano is an Assistant Professor of History at Simmons University. He specializes in the US and Latin American History.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelan editorial staff.

The post Constructing an Echo Chamber: A Legacy of Media Bias Towards Chávez’s Venezuela appeared first on Venezuelanalysis.

Venezuela: US Shrinks Chevron Wind-Down Period to 30 Days Following ‘Crazy Cubans’ Pressure

Caracas, March 4, 2025 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Treasury Department has handed Chevron a one-month window to cease its activities in Venezuela.

On Tuesday, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 41A (GL41A) establishing that the energy giant’s operations in its Venezuela joint ventures are only authorized through April 3.

The new document replaced General License 41 (GL41), which was issued by the Biden administration in November 2022 allowing Chevron to resume crude extraction and export processes in the Caribbean Nation. Under the new restrictions, the company is not even allowed to perform basic maintenance operations.

The Donald Trump administration announced its decision to force a shutdown of Chevron’s Venezuela activities on February 27. The White House argued that the Nicolás Maduro government did not fulfill electoral pledges and was not accepting migrant deportations fast enough.

The sanctions waiver withdrawal, alongside the highly shortened wind-down period, marks a significant escalation of Washington’s economic coercion against Venezuela. The moves contrast with Trump’s early engagement with Caracas which saw Special Envoy Richard Grenell hold a high-profile meeting with Maduro.

Axios reported that the revocation of Chevron’s license, a long-standing demand of foreign policy extremists and Venezuelan far-right politicians, was a result of pressure from Florida Republican House members ahead of a crucial US Congress budget decision.

Representatives Mario Diaz-Balart, Carlos Gimenez and Maria Elvira Salazar produced key votes in the narrowly approved budget deal following the announcement of GL41’s removal. Nicknamed “Crazy Cubans” in reference to their roots, the three politicians heavily lobbied the administration to ramp up economic aggression against Caracas.

Though they also opposed the White House’s cancellation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Venezuelan migrants, leaving some 600,000 at risk of deportation, Diaz-Balart, Gimenez and Salazar prioritized the hardening of sanctions over their constituents’ interests.

For its part, the Maduro government criticized the planned withdrawal of Chevron’s sanctions exemption as “damaging and inexplicable,” while vowing that the country’s economic recovery would continue.

On Tuesday afternoon, Caracas issued a statement accusing the US government of “bowing to the pressure” of the Venezuelan opposition. Authorities went on to announce the activation of an “Absolute Productive Independence” plan to secure the stability of the energy sector.

GL41 was the Biden administration’s only major departure from the “maximum pressure” campaign imposed by Trump in his first term. OFAC issued General License 44 in October 2023, allowing Venezuela to freely export crude, but widespread restrictions were reimposed six months later.

The South American country’s most important industry remains heavily burdened by coercive measures, including financial sanctions, an export embargo and secondary sanctions.

The US Treasury Department likewise announced a review of authorizations granted to other foreign corporations to deal with Venezuela’s oil sector. European firms Repsol (Spain), Eni (Italy) and Maurel & Prom (France) all received Washington’s green light in recent years to ramp up operations in energy projects. Indian refining giant Reliance received permission to import Venezuelan crude.

Trinidad and Tobago’s state-owned National Gas Company also sought US approval to pursue two natural gas projects in Venezuelan waters alongside BP and Shell, respectively.

Chevron holds minority stakes in four joint ventures that currently produce around 200,000 crude barrels per day (bpd), 20-25 percent of the country’s total output. According to Reuters, the company will abide by the Treasury’s directions to implement GL41.

The sudden removal of the firm’s sanctions waiver will have an immediate impact on Venezuela’s oil production. Washington’s sanctions ramp-up is likely to foster increased overcompliance as well, with international agents more inclined to avoid transactions with state oil company PDVSA. Venezuela has been forced to levy significant discounts and resort to unreliable intermediaries in order to export crude cargoes.

Analysts additionally predict that the fall in oil revenues will affect the Venezuelan government’s social spending ability and the supply of foreign currency, potentially triggering renewed inflation.

Edited by Cira Pascual Marquina in Caracas.

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Venezuela-Guyana Tensions Flare Over Oil-Rich Waters

Mexico City, Mexico, March 3, 2025 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Caracas rejected Guyanese accusations over an alleged incursion by a Venezuelan Navy vessel in the oil-rich waters of the Essequibo region.

Guyana’s President Irfaan Ali accused a Venezuelan naval patrol of approaching an oil facility linked to ExxonMobil’s drilling operations in the disputed offshore area.

Venezuela responded via a statement on Saturday that instead claimed the territorial waters are not Guyanese but rather a “maritime zone pending delimitation in accordance with international law.”

“Venezuela categorically repudiates the unfounded statements of the President of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, Irfaan Ali, who blatantly lies by claiming that units of the Bolivarian Navy of Venezuela are violating Guyana’s maritime territory,” read the communique.

Ali said he had summoned the Venezuelan ambassador and instructed Guyana’s embassy to lodge a formal protest with the Venezuelan government. In a televised address, he called the incursion “a matter of grave concern.”

Caracas accused the Guyanese president of deliberately escalating the ongoing controversy over the Essequibo, comparing him to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who recently made headlines after clashing with US President Donald Trump inside the White House.

“The statements of Irfaan Ali, the Caribbean Zelensky, are full of inaccuracies, falsehoods and contradictions, in his eagerness to disrupt the peace and tranquility of our region by sowing a dangerous conflict,” said the Nicolás Maduro government in its statement.

The US State Department weighed in on the matter, siding with Georgetown and calling the disputed waters “Guyana’s internationally-recognized maritime territory” before threatening Venezuela.

“Further provocation will result in consequences for the Maduro regime.” read a post by the State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs published on Saturday. Washington also reiterated its support for an 1899 arbitration ruling that awarded the 160,000 square-kilometer territory to the United Kingdom, Guyana’s former colonial power.

Venezuelan authorities have repeatedly denounced a US-backed increased militarization of the region, including joint military drills between Guyanese forces and the US Southern Command.

The Maduro government, following its predecessors, has a longstanding position that the 1966 Geneva Agreement remains the only mechanism to solve the two-century-old border controversy. The accord establishes that the two countries must reach a mutually agreeable settlement to the two-century-old border issue.

The resource-rich, sparsely populated Essequibo Strip is presently administered by Guyana.

The latest diplomatic spat follows a recent armed clash in the disputed region that saw six members of the Guyanese Defense Forces (GDF) wounded in a reported firefight with an armed group. Caracas likewise accused Ali of manipulating the incident for political ends.

According to Venezuelan authorities, people involved in illegal mining activities in the Essequibo territory were attacked by Guyanese soldiers, resulting in several wounded that are being treated in Venezuelan territory.

In response to these recent incidents, Venezuela said it would invoke the December 2023 “Argyle Mechanism” that established a dialogue mechanism between the two Caribbean nations. The Maduro government says the protocol “represents the spirit of the Geneva Agreement” while also reaffirming its claim over the disputed strip and territorial waters.

The sovereignty over the Essequibo region is currently the subject of International Court of Justice (ICJ) proceedings after Guyana requested that the court enforce the 1899 arbitration ruling. Venezuela has rejected the court’s jurisdiction over the matter but has presented its defense.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

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Organization and Production: The 4F Huo̧ttö̧ja̧ Commune (Part II)

The Huo̧ttö̧ja̧ people in Venezuela’s Amazonas state have long resisted colonization and proudly preserve their language. Today they are building communes that draw both on Chávez’s socialist roadmap and their ancestral ways of organization, including collective land tenure and assembly-based governance.

The February 4 Huo̧ttö̧ja̧ Commune sits on the edge of a savanna that gradually turns into rainforest and is crossed by the beautiful Parhueña River. While the majority of this commune’s population is Huo̧ttö̧ja, as indicated by the commune’s name, there are also Kurripakos, Jivis, Banivas, and a small number of non-Indigenous people.

The commune comprises 12 communal councils and a total population of about 2500, with the largest community being Limón de Parhueña, home to about 750 people. Some of the smaller communities that are tucked away in the woodlands preserve traditions such as living in churuatas [thatched buildings], and can only be reached by foot or motorbike. The most distant community in this commune, the Alto Parhuani Communal Council, is six hours away on foot.

In this three-part series, the men and women who have built the February 4 Huo̧ttö̧ja̧ Commune share their knowledge about organizational practices, agricultural production, and forms of resistance to the US blockade. The first installment focused on the history and traditions of the Huo̧ttö̧ja̧ people. In this second part, the inhabitants of February 4 talk about the methods of organization and production in their commune.

[Part of VA’s Communal Resistance Series]
Estela Pesquera is a catara producer in Damasco de Parhueña Communal Council | María Solórzano lives in Limón de Parhueña and works for Fundacomunal, a state institution that supports communal councils | Nereo López Pérez is a popular educator and professor who works to preserve Limón de Parhueña’s stories; his Huo̧ttö̧ja̧ name is Inaru | Simón Pérez is the capitán of the Chähuerä community | Sirelyis Rivas is a spokesperson of the Limón de Parhueña Communal Council | Sofía Pérez is a catara producer in Damasco de Parhueña Communal Council |Óscar Freddy Yusuino is a Kurripako catara producer. (Rome Arrieche)

A multiethnic commune

The February 4 Huo̧ttö̧ja̧ Commune is multiethnic in character. A majority of its people are Huo̧ttö̧ja̧. However, it also includes a sizable Kurripako community, as well as Jivi, Baniva, and non-Indigenous members.

THE FEBRUARY 4 HUO̧TTÖ̧JA̧ COMMUNE

Sirelyis Rivas: This commune is named February 4, because Venezuelan history changed its course on that day in 1992 [due to an insurrection led by Chávez]. The Huo̧ttö̧ja̧ people identified with that struggle, as we too have a long history of struggling against domination, against the Spanish empire, and against all other forms of oppression.

María Solórzano: The February 4 Commune is a multiethnic organization that brings together twelve communal councils. Most of the population here is Indigenous, but there are a few criollo [non-indigenous] people like myself.

I have lived in Limón de Parhueña [the commune’s largest communal council] for 20 years now, but I also work for Fundacomunal [state institution that supports communal councils], so I’m a sort of go-between the commune and the institution.

In the commune I’m an observer: I respect the processes of the community and in fact I mostly help with paperwork. I believe in People’s Power: I know that for communal self-government to work, the people have to be in charge, not the institutions.

This commune is highly organized despite its diversity. Not only is it ethnically diverse, but its territorial composition also varies significantly. Some communal councils are small and remote, requiring hours on foot to reach them. On the other hand, Limón de Parhueña is larger, has relatively modern infrastructure, and is located close to the main road.

In terms of production, the February 4 Commune shares a common project: conuco-based agriculture [diversified small-scale farming] and the processing of yuca into products such as mañoco [yuca flour] and casabe [flatbread]. The Kurripako people also produce catara, a wonderful yuca-based sauce that is very spicy.

Sirelyis Rivas: The commune and the assembly are practically the same for us. In the assembly, we think about how to solve our problems and who has to do what to reach our objective. We have to listen and be listened to. This process is deeply rooted in our Indigenous culture, and we are committed to preserving these traditions. Without our language and customs, we would cease to exist.

Indigenous communities are, in general, very well organized because of our living traditions. We seek unity and harmony, and therefore we look to foster mutual support and privilege kindness over exclusion: this is the only way that we will be able to overcome capitalism. We have been fighting for a long time, so we know that we can only succeed together.

LIMÓN DE PARHUEÑA, THE LARGEST COMMUNAL COUNCIL

Nereo López Pérez: Before we settled in Limón de Parhueña, our Huo̧ttö̧ja̧ ancestors lived along the Raudal Guaremo [a river]. My parents were born there. But in 1970, President Rafael Caldera sent a military commission to speak with my father, proposing that our family and others relocate to a new settlement closer to the state capital, Puerto Ayacucho, where we would have access to services, schools, and medical care.

Three families, including mine, relocated here first – we were the vanguard. The following year, in 1971, an employee of ONIDEX [then Venezuela’s institution for citizenship and migration services] visited and proposed that the government build houses. That’s how the first 15 homes were built. My family’s home was one of them. Several waves of construction followed.

The community was named Parhueña because it took shape along the Parhueña River, as did the other communities that are now part of our commune.

Though founded by Huo̧ttö̧ja̧ people, our community is now multiethnic and pluricultural. In addition to the Huo̧ttö̧ja̧ people, there are Kurripakos, Jivis, Banivas, and a few non-Indigenous people. Each Indigenous group maintains its traditions and language, thus preserving its culture. However, we have learned to come together, respect one another, and share our knowledge.

The multiethnic and pluricultural character of this community goes back very early; when the school opened its doors in Limón de Parhueña in 1972, 27 kids enrolled – they were Kurripakos, Banivas, and Huo̧ttö̧ja̧s.
A person takes yuca from the conuco back home to make casabe [flatbread] and mañoco [flour]. (Rome Arrieche)
POPULAR CONSULTATIONS

Sirelyis Rivas: The popular consultations were exactly what our commune needed at a time when our organization was a bit dormant. If we are truly committed to popular power, we must seek collective solutions rather than individual ones, and that is precisely what these consultations foster. I congratulate President Maduro for this initiative and hope it will become a permanent feature of our process.

When people are struggling but there’s no clear incentive to organize, mobilization can be difficult. These consultations bring access to tangible resources and therefore result in tangible solutions. As a result of the first consultation [April 2024], we obtained corrugated zinc sheets to replace the roofs of the most vulnerable homes.

The second consultation has proven even more important for the commune as a whole, because we are acquiring tools that are needed for our productive processes, including cigueñas [yuca grinders], machetes, peinillas [long machetes], and rubber boots.

María Solórzano: We carefully follow the methodology that was laid out for the consultations: each communal council gathers and proposes up to three projects that will have a real impact on the community. These proposals are then brought before a larger assembly for deliberation. The most important part of this process is the debate, even if the final decision on which project will receive funding is reached through voting.

Everyone is accounted for in this process, even the smallest communities. In the 4F Commune, we have large communal councils with hundreds of people, but we also have very small ones with less than 20 people. The Indigenous Peoples’ Law ensures that institutions respect the customs and traditions of each Indigenous community, allowing even small and remote communities to organize their own communal councils. Everyone must be heard.

THE COMMUNE: ADVANTAGES AND CONTRADICTIONS

Sirelyis Rivas: Some see the commune only as an administrative entity to get resources and solve our problems. There is nothing wrong with that perspective.

However, I think that the commune can be much more than that. Institutions are not always able to solve the problems we have: there are cultural differences, there are language barriers, and they are generally inhabited by criollos who may not understand our ways. When it comes to the commune, on the other hand, we can shape it in a way that actually looks like us.

It also enables us to work with the institutions on equal terms. I’m really committed to the commune and I think I’m not mistaken, because we can already see some of its fruits.

Nereo López Pérez: I think that Chávez had the right idea when he spoke of the communes, but there are obstacles that we still have to overcome. Communal councils are the building blocks for the communes. According to the law, the territory of a community council must be very strictly defined. That’s why Fundacomunal says that a communal council begins here [in one very precise area] and ends there [in a precise boundary]. Yet that’s not how Indigenous people understand the territory.

Article 119 of the Constitution says that Indigenous communities will be in charge of the demarcation of our territories according to our history and traditions. That’s good because we never practiced line drawing and barrier building. Our ancestors might have settled at the base of a hill or beside a river, but a few years later they might move the entire community upriver.

It is not good for us to organize the world with lines and borders, but the way that communal councils are drawn takes us in that direction. Communal councils and communes are good, but institutions should respond better to our particular context and our traditions.

One more thing: I believe we should have more direct control over the administration of resources by our people. As Huo̧ttö̧ja̧ people, we have never administered state-supplied funds directly, and that needs to change. I want my community to oversee the resources allocated to us.

I can’t say for sure whether we will prioritize production, culture, education, sports, or the environment. But what I know is that the allocation and management of funds should be in our hands. That’s how I see it.

The practice of popular consultations is a good first step in this direction, but direct administration of the resources assigned to our Indigenous communities is still a long-term demand for us.

Sirelyis Rivas: All human beings are imperfect, and institutions are imperfect too – we all have strengths and weaknesses. As far as the government’s shortcomings are concerned, our main problem as Huo̧ttö̧ja̧ farmers is getting our produce to market because we are ways away from town [Puerto Ayacucho]. Getting there isn’t easy.

This is a challenge that can be overcome by organizing ourselves together with the regional or national government, which should take action to deal with the situation. Beyond that, there are some vulnerable families struggling with food insecurity and health problems, and the government should also step in to help them.
A shed for making casabe and mañoco. (Rome Arrieche)

Production

Agricultural production in the February 4 Commune centers around the conuco, a diversified, family-run plot of land. The key crop in this commune is yuca, which is used to make casabe, an Indigenous flatbread, mañoco, granulated flour, and catara, a spicy sauce.

THE LAND AND WHAT IT GIVES

Nereo López Pérez: Our livelihood depends on the land, the conuco. The conuco is an ancestral farming practice that is not exploitative: in our plots, we grow sweet and bitter yuca, plantain, pineapple, and so on.

Today each conuco is cared for by one family, but earlier generations tended to their conucos collectively. Nevertheless, the practice of sharing is still with us. If someone needs something of ours, we give it to them. That is the Huo̧ttö̧ja̧ way.

Sirelyis Rivas: In our conucos, alongside yuca and plantain, we also grow ñame [yam], copoazú [a tropical fruit], and cocoa. Yuca is at the center of our diet and culture – we use it to make casabe and mañoco, our ancestral staples.

Near my family’s conuco we have a shed for producing both casabe and mañoco. We take turns because it’s a long and demanding process: Today my sister-in-law is working there, but tomorrow it will be my turn.

The workday lasts from dawn to dusk. Our days begin with harvesting the yuca in the conuco and taking it to our shed. We then peel and grind it, pressing it in the sebucán [an elongated sieve to drain out the liquid]. Finally, we cook it on a budare [a flat griddle] while tending to the fire.

Depending on how things go, we can bring 20 to 50 flatbreads to the “Mercado Indígena” in Puerto Ayacucho every Saturday.

In addition to tending to the conuco, we also hunt lapa and picure [two large rodents], deer, and cachicamo [armadillo]. We use traps and arrows to hunt them, but we only hunt these animals for self-subsistence, never for the market.

Nereo López Pérez: A conuco has a five-year lifespan. What does that mean in practical terms? The land that we work on requires a fallow period after five years, so we move our conuco to another location when the land is exhausted. Just like people need to rest, the land also needs to rest.
Chähuerä is a beautiful community that can only be reached on foot or by motorcycle. (Rome Arrieche)
PRODUCTION IN THE CHÄHUERÄ COMMUNAL COUNCIL

Simón Pérez: This is a very small community that sits beside the river at the foot of Cerro Peramán. We live in traditional churuatas, maintain our language and many of our ancestral traditions, but we are Christians.

As the capitán of Chähuerä, I work with my community to organize production. Here everyone who can work must do so and will live with dignity, but if someone can work and doesn’t, they won’t eat. At the same time, if someone is struggling due to their circumstances, we will always help them.

In our community, we are working hard to expand cocoa and copoazú production, though yuca remains essential for making casabe and mañoco. My brother and I tend to 1.5 hectares of cocoa and one hectare of copoazú. Right now, copoazú is our main source of income, but I believe that in three years, we will have a good cocoa harvest. Our cocoa will be of excellent quality because our land is rich, and we grow everything organically.

But we also hunt, mostly using dogs, since shotgun cartridges are hard to come by. Because of this, we primarily hunt lapas, picures, and other small mammals. Our dogs are trained to track the animals to their dens, where we finish the hunt with a machete or an arrow. We also fish.

Ours is a peaceful community that lives in harmony. Our biggest challenge is the issue of road access, which makes it difficult to bring our products to market. We also face threats from wildlife, particularly snakes and jaguars. Just a few days ago, a jaguar killed one of our hunting dogs – losing a dog is a significant setback for us, as they are essential to our way of life.
The Indigenous market on Saturdays in Puerto Ayacucho is used by many Indigenous communities in the area. (Rome Arrieche)
PRODUCTION IN DAMASCO DE PARHUEÑA, A FEBRUARY 4 COMMUNAL COUNCIL

Sofía Pérez: This community is mostly Kurripako, though I am Huo̧ttö̧ja̧. Like many Kurripako communities, this one is known for producing catara, a spicy sauce that enhances the flavor of meat, fish, and casabe. It makes everything taste better!

I learned to make catara from my Kurripako mother-in-law. The key ingredient is the yare, a liquid extracted from bitter yuca and boiled for hours. To this base, we add bachaco [a large ant], which gives the sauce its spiciness and texture, along with an ají-based seasoning.

We grow yuca in our conuco, which is about a two-hour walk from here, and we also have to walk long distances to gather the bachaco.

Óscar Freddy Yusui: We produce catara for the market, and the income from sales allows us to buy staples like oil, sugar, and sometimes coffee. However, much of what we grow in our conuco is for family consumption. Reaching the conuco requires a two- to three-hour walk, and we have to go there two to four times a week to tend the crops and harvest what we need.

Estela Pesquera: Catara is a wonderful sauce with many health benefits. It’s a tradition passed down from our mothers and grandmothers. Most Kurripako women make it, each with her own secret touch, and we sell it at the Indigenous market on Saturdays or by commission. Still, our families rely heavily on our conucos for food, which means we are not entirely dependent on the market. That’s probably why the blockade didn’t hit us so hard.

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